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Case No. 20160502-SC 
IN THE 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
ANH TUAM PHAM, 
Defendant/Petitioner. 
Brief of Respondent 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
 This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court 
of Appeals in State v. Pham, 2016 UT App 105, 372 P.3d 734 (Addendum A).  
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(5) (West 
2009). 
INTRODUCTION 
 Petitioner Anh Pham shot Luis Menchaca in the groin at point-blank 
range.  Luis testified at the preliminary hearing, and Pham cross-examined 
him without limitation.  By the time of trial, Luis had returned to Mexico. 
Despite diligent efforts, the State could not locate him.  The trial court found 
Luis unavailable and admitted his preliminary hearing testimony over 
Pham’s confrontation objection.   
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 Pham appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed, holding that, 
under Crawford v. Washington, Pham’s right to confront Luis was satisfied 
because Luis was unavailable and Pham had a prior opportunity to cross-
examine him at the preliminary hearing.  
 Pham argues that a preliminary hearing can almost never afford an 
adequate opportunity for cross-examination.  But in a long, unbroken line of 
cases, both the United States Supreme Court and this Court have held the 
opposite.  And the court of appeals here did not foreclose the possibility 
that a particular preliminary hearing might not afford such an opportunity. 
It correctly held that this case fell outside that possibility.       
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
 1.  This Court granted review on the following question: “Whether 
the court of appeals erred in concluding Petitioner had failed to 
demonstrate that his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against 
him was violated by the presentation of the victim[‘]s preliminary hearing 
testimony at his trial.”  Order, September 12, 2016. 
 Standard of Review.  This Court reviews the court of appeals’ decision 
for correctness.  Brierley v. Layton City, 2016 UT 46, ¶18, __ P.3d __.   
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
 The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are 
reproduced in Addendum B:  
 United States Constitution, Amendment VI; 
 Utah Constitution, Article I, § 12. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary of facts. 
Luis Menchaca and his girlfriend, Donna Olmeno, went to a 7-Eleven 
to buy Slurpees.  R291:6.  There, they saw Anh Tuam Pham “bullying” two 
boys on bikes. R292:15. Pham and his friend Yeth Yan—who had been 
partying and “ran out of beer”—had gone to the 7-Eleven to resupply. 
R293:61–62; R292:43, 57, 66. The four were not acquainted. R291:7.  
From the moment they arrived, Olmeno had a “bad vibe, like there 
was going to be problems,” because she saw Pham “picking on” the boys. 
R292:18, 21, 35. As Menchaca and Olmeno entered the store, the boys asked 
them for a ride. Wanting “no drama, no nothing,” Menchaca said no. 
R292:21, R291:8. 
Once back outside, standing next to his truck, Menchaca watched 
Pham harass the boys again. R291:8. The boys again asked Menchaca for a 
ride. Id; R292:22. Pham, who was only a few feet away, turned around and 
asked Menchaca if he “wanted problems too.” R292:22, 39; R291:8-9. 
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Menchaca said, “No.” Id. Pham repeated two or three times, “[D]o you want 
problems too,” and Menchaca repeated each time: “No, I don’t want 
problems.” R292:39. 
Suddenly, Pham pulled a gun out of his pocket and pointed it at 
Menchaca. R291:9. Menchaca’s girlfriend screamed, “[A]re you going to 
shoot him? Are you going to shoot him when there is cops across the 
street?” R292:24. Pham pointed the gun at Menchaca’s groin. State Exh. 4b. 
“[W]atch me,” he said before shooting Menchaca. R292:24. 
The single bullet produced three wounds, one right above 
Menchaca’s penis on his right side, one through his scrotum on his left side, 
and one in his leg, where the bullet is permanently lodged. State Ex. 3; 
R291:9–10; R293:103-04. 
While Menchaca jumped up and down, Pham hopped into his white 
minivan and put it in reverse. R292:9–11, 26, 49–52, 94, 99; R293:71. Two 
police officers—guns drawn—chased after Pham yelling “stop, police stop, 
police, stop now.” R292:51–53, 78–80, 95. But Pham just “sped off.” R292:94.  
Menchaca began to feel dizzy. R291:11. He sat down and stuck his 
hand into the hole in his pants; it came out bloody. R291:11; R292:96. When 
the officers found him, Menchaca was “holding between his legs.” R292:96. 
They called the ambulance, and Menchaca was transported to the hospital, 
-5- 
where he stayed for three days. 291:11; R292:96–97. The entire episode was 
caught on tape by the outdoor 7-Eleven security camera. State Exh. 4a, 4b. 
Pham and Yan ditched their minivan in the adjoining neighborhood. 
R292:53. They stole a family’s running SUV with the father chasing after 
them. R292:53–56; 293:10–14. The duo then threw Pham’s striped shirt into 
some bushes, drove a few blocks, and abandoned the stolen SUV around 
the corner from Yan’s fourplex—where they had been “partying” earlier in 
the evening. R293:11, 13–14; R292:55, 66. 
Police officers found Pham at that fourplex later that night. R293:33. 
He was dressed in different clothes than on the security footage and as 
reported by eyewitnesses. R292:70, 82; R293:22. 
B. Summary of proceedings. 
Preliminary hearing.  Four months later, Pham’s victim testified at the 
preliminary hearing. Menchaca identified Pham and testified that Pham 
was harassing the two boys on bicycles when Pham pulled out his gun and 
shot him. R291:7–9.  Menchaca also testified about his injuries. R291:9–11, 
12–14. He testified that he felt dizzy, bled from his groin wounds, was in the 
hospital for three days after the shooting, could not walk without pain for 
two weeks, could not sleep at night without pain in the sole of his foot, 
believed the bullet hit a nerve in his leg that caused problems with his big 
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toe, returned to the hospital after two weeks to have x-rays because of the 
pain, and could still feel the bullet lodged in his leg. R291:12-14. 
Pham’s attorney cross-examined Menchaca. R291:14. The State’s 
direct examination spans eleven pages, R291:4–14; Pham’s cross-
examination spans thirteen R291:14–26. He asked Menchaca about his 
background, marital status, failure to pay hospital bills, interactions with 
police the day of the incident, relationship to those involved, ability to 
perceive, memory, and details of the incident.  Id. The State did not object to 
any of counsel’s questions, and the trial court placed no limitations on 
counsel’s cross-examination. Id. In cross-examination, Pham’s attorney 
discovered that aside from harassing the two boys on bikes, Pham also 
pushed them just before shooting Menchaca. R291:20. 
Trial.  By the time of trial, Menchaca was no longer in Utah.  The State 
tracked Menchaca to Mexico—first to Minchocan and then to Guanajuato—
but, even working with the Los Angeles Police Department, Foreign 
Prosecution/Interpol, the State was unable to discover Menchaca’s 
whereabouts or to procure his presence at trial. R104–108.  Pham did not 
then, and does not now, dispute that Menchaca was unavailable at trial.   
During trial, over Pham’s objection, the court allowed the State to 
read Menchaca’s preliminary hearing testimony into the record because 
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Menchaca was unavailable to testify and Pham had cross-examined him at 
the preliminary hearing. R292:41; R134–136. 
The jury found Pham guilty of discharge of a firearm with serious 
bodily injury, receiving or transferring a stolen motor vehicle, obstructing 
justice, and failure to respond to an officer’s signal to stop.  R274. The trial 
court sentenced Pham to concurrent prison terms of five years to life for 
felony discharge of a firearm; one to fifteen years for receiving or 
transferring a stolen vehicle; one to fifteen years for obstructing justice; and 
zero to five years for failure to stop or respond at the command of an officer. 
R278–79. 
Court of Appeals’ decision.  Pham timely appealed, arguing that 
admitting the victim’s preliminary hearing testimony violated his 
confrontation right because preliminary hearings were so limited in scope 
that they could not afford an adequate opportunity to cross-examine.1  
Pham, 2016 UT App 105, ¶¶9-10.  Pham argued that three aspects of 
preliminary hearings rendered them inadequate opportunities for cross-
examination: (1) the magistrate’s limited ability to determine credibility; (2) 
                                              
1 Pham also argued in the court of appeals that the evidence was 
insufficient to convict him of discharge of a firearm with serious bodily 
injury.  Pham, 2016 UT App 105, ¶8.  The court of appeals rejected that 
claim, and he does not seek certiorari on that issue.  
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the magistrate’s duty to draw all reasonable inferences in the prosecution’s 
favor; and (3) the State’s low burden of proof.  Id. at ¶¶13-14, 16; see generally 
State v. Jones, 2016 UT 4, 365 P.3d 1212 (discussing preliminary hearing 
standards). 
The court of appeals—consistent with its own, this Court’s, and the 
United States Supreme Court’s precedent—disagreed.  Pham, 2016 UT App 
105, ¶¶11-12 (citing State v. Garrido, 2013 UT App 245, 314 P.3d 1014). The 
court explained that neither its own precedent “nor Crawford [v. Washington] 
state a blanket rule that an opportunity to cross-examine a witness at a 
preliminary hearing will always, as a matter of law, satisfy a defendant’s 
right to confrontation.” Id. at ¶12. “Rather,” the court continued, it 
understood “those cases to set forth the general proposition that it is possible 
for the cross-examination opportunity at a preliminary hearing to satisfy 
that right.” Id. Because Pham did not allege that his motive changed 
between preliminary hearing and trial, the trial court did not limit his cross-
examination in any way, and Pham did “not identify any shortcomings in 
the cross-examination” at preliminary hearing, the court of appeals held 
that he did not show a confrontation violation.  Id. at ¶¶18-19 & n.4. 
The court of appeals explained that the characteristics of preliminary 
hearings do not “limit the ability of a defendant to conduct a full cross-
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examination” because they “impose[d] no obvious structural limitation on 
the scope or depth of cross-examination” in that setting.  Pham, 2016 UT 
App 105, ¶17.  Thus, the court could not “conclude that cross-examinations 
conducted within Utah’s preliminary hearing framework can never satisfy a 
defendant’s” confrontation rights.  Id. (citing State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537 
(Utah 1981).  The court likewise refused to decide “whether the inverse 
[was] true”—that is, whether preliminary hearings always satisfy a 
defendant’s confrontation rights.  Id. at ¶18.  
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 Pham argues that because a preliminary hearing is limited to 
determining whether probable cause exists to bind a defendant over for 
trial, there is less motive to cross-examine, which renders that prior 
opportunity inadequate to satisfy the confrontation right.  This position 
contradicts over a century of precedent from the United States Supreme 
Court, this Court, and the court of appeals.  Pham has provided no 
compelling reason to depart from this precedent, particularly where the 
United States Supreme Court has considered—and rejected—the sort of 
arguments he makes.  Under this long, unbroken line of precedent, Pham’s 
prior opportunity to cross-examine the victim at the preliminary hearing 
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satisfied his right to confront him when he became unavailable to testify at 
trial.   
 Preliminary hearings in Utah—notwithstanding their limited 
purpose—retain the relevant attributes that the Supreme Court has held 
make them “trial-like”: witnesses are placed under oath, testify at a 
recorded hearing in front of a judge, the defendant is represented by 
counsel, and he has a rule-based right to cross-examine.  And defense 
counsel is animated by the same motive and interest—to further the 
defendant’s chances of success—at preliminary hearing no less than at trial, 
notwithstanding a state constitutional amendment permitting the State to 
present reliable hearsay at preliminary hearings. Further, the concerns that 
Pham points to—such as a judge limiting cross-examination—do not apply 
to his case.  
 The correct rule is essentially a mirror image of Pham’s proposed 
rule. Pham argues that preliminary hearings as a general rule cannot afford 
an adequate opportunity for cross-examination “absent exceptional 
circumstances.”  In reality, preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable 
declarant is generally admissible absent exceptional circumstances, such as 
where a magistrate significantly limits cross-examination on credibility 
issues.    
-11- 
    
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Preliminary hearings can provide an adequate opportunity 
for cross-examining a witness who is unavailable to testify at 
trial. 
 Pham argues that the court of appeals erroneously held that cross-
examination at preliminary hearings takes place “under the same motive 
and interest” as cross-examination at trial because the precedent on which 
the court of appeals relied for this proposition—this Court’s decision in 
State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537 (Utah 1981)—was later overruled by state 
constitutional amendment.2  Aplt.Br. 12-16.  He also asserts that preliminary 
hearings can almost never satisfy the confrontation clause because of their 
                                              
2 Pham cites to this amendment as evidence of a confrontation 
violation, Pet.Br. 5-6, 17, but his claim is made entirely under the Sixth 
Amendment. Id. at 12-13, 16, 26-27. Although he briefly references the state 
constitution, id. at 13, he makes no separate argument regarding it, and his 
constitutional argument relies solely on cases addressing the Sixth 
Amendment’s Confrontation Clause. See id. at 7, 12-28. He does not argue 
that the state constitution was violated; rather, he asserts that a state 
constitutional change shows a federal violation. Id. at 5-6, 17. And the Court 
of Appeals addressed only a federal claim. See Pham, 2016 UT App 105, ¶¶3-
19. This Court has “repeatedly refrained from engaging in state 
constitutional law analysis unless ‘an argument for different analyses under 
the state and federal constitutions is briefed’.” See State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 
47 ¶16, 164 P.3d 397, 405 (quoting State v. Laferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 n.5 
(Utah 1988)). Because Pham has not separately briefed a state constitutional 
claim—which would be unpreserved at any rate—the State confines its 
analysis to the Sixth Amendment. 
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“very limited” purpose of establishing probable cause, which does “not 
allow . . . for purposeful and rigorous cross-examination.”  Id. at 14, 16.  
These factors, according to him, render preliminary hearings all but per se 
inadequate opportunities for cross-examination. Id. at 22. Pham is mistaken.  
A long, unbroken line of decisions from both the United States Supreme 
Court and this Court show that preliminary hearing testimony can be 
admissible at trial where the declarant is unavailable.  This Court should 
hew to that precedent, as Pham offers no compelling reason to depart from 
it.  
A. Preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable declarant 
has long been admissible under the Confrontation Clause. 
 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects an 
accused’s right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him” at trial.  
U.S. CONST. amend. VI; State v. Timmerman, 2009 UT 58, ¶ 9, 218 P.3d 590.  
But this right is not absolute.  The Confrontation Clause applies only to 
“testimonial” hearsay.  Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).  A 
hearsay statement is “testimonial” if, in making it, the declarant “bears 
testimony” against a defendant. Id. at 51. Testimonial hearsay includes, 
among other things, “prior testimony at a preliminary hearing.”  Crawford, 
541 U.S. at 51, 59, 68.   
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 But even testimonial hearsay is admissible at trial if (1) the declarant 
is unavailable to testify and (2) the defendant had a prior opportunity to 
cross-examine the declarant about the prior statements.  Id. at 68.  Prior 
testimony—whether given at a prior trial or a preliminary hearing—has 
long been admissible where these conditions are met.  Id. at 57 (citing 
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 241 (1895)); see also State v. Menzies, 889 
P.2d 393, 403 (1994).   
 Unavailability is not at issue here.  The trial court found the victim 
unavailable, R292:41, R134–136, and Pham does not contest that ruling. 
As to the second requirement, the Sixth Amendment guarantees only 
the opportunity to cross-examine. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 (“the Sixth 
Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability and a 
prior opportunity for cross-examination”) (emphasis added).  As this Court 
has long recognized, even where a defendant “may have elected to forgo 
cross-examination” that “does not mean that the opportunity was not 
available.”  State v. Nelson, 725 P.2d 1353, 1357 (Utah 1986); see State v. Pecht, 
2002 UT 41, ¶39, 48 P.3d 931; State v. Jolley, 571 P.2d 582, 586 (Utah 1977); see 
also Barger v. Oklahoma, 238 F. App’x. 343, 346-47 (10th Cir. 2007); United 
States v. Williams, 116 F. App’x. 890, 891 (9th Cir. 2004); Simmons v. State, 234 
S.W.3d 321, 326 (Ark. Ct. App. 2006); People v. Williams, 181 P.3d 1035, 1061 
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(Cal. 2008); People v. Yost, 749 N.W.2d 753, 774-75 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008); 
State v. Artis, 215 S.W.3d 327, 335 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007).   
Thus, satisfying the Sixth Amendment confrontation right does not 
require that cross-examination will take place at all, let alone “cross-
examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the 
defense might wish.”  United States v. Owens 484 U.S. 554, 559 (1988) 
(citations omitted); Pecht, 2002 UT 41, ¶39; see also People v. Cowan, 236 P.3d 
1074, 1126 (Cal. 2010) (“Nothing in Crawford casts doubt on the continuing 
vitality of Owens.”).  Whether a prior opportunity is “adequate” depends on 
the facts of a case.   
Both the United States Supreme Court and this Court have long held 
that the preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable witness may be 
admissible at trial.3  More than a century ago, the United States Supreme 
                                              
3 The Supreme Court excluded the preliminary hearing testimony of 
an unavailable witness in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406-08 (1965). But the 
problems in Pointer—that Pointer lacked counsel at the preliminary hearing 
and the government made no attempt to procure the out-of-state witness to 
testify at trial—are not present here. Other Supreme Court cases excluding 
preliminary hearing testimony on confrontation grounds have generally 
involved circumstances—also not present here—where the declarant was 
not truly unavailable.  See id.; see also Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968) 
(preliminary hearing testimony inadmissible where State did not seek 
presence); Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458 (1900) (witness unavailable 
due to negligence of government); see also State v. Oniskor, 510 P.2d 929 
(Utah 1973). (preliminary hearing testimony inadmissible at trial where 
State had not proven unavailability).  
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Court addressed this possibility in Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 
(1985).  Mattox was convicted of a murder in Indian territory.  Id.at 239.  His 
conviction was reversed on appeal, and he was tried a second time, which 
resulted in a hung jury.  Id. at 251.  By the time of his third trial, two of the 
witnesses against him had died.  Id. at 240.  The trial court permitted those 
witnesses’ prior testimonies—in the form of reporter’s notes—to be read at 
Mattox’s third trial.  Id.  He was convicted and appealed, claiming that 
admission of this prior testimony violated his confrontation rights.  Id.   
In holding the testimony admissible, the Supreme Court noted that 
“the authority in favor of the admissibility of such testimony, where the 
defendant was present either at the examination of the deceased witness before 
a committing magistrate, or upon a former trial of the same case, is 
overwhelming.” Id. at 242 (emphasis added). In support, the court favorably 
cited more than a dozen lower court cases, including one in which “the 
substance of a deceased witness’ testimony given at a preliminary 
examination was held to be admissible.”  Id. at 242 (citing United States v. 
Macomb, 5 McLean 286, Fed. Cas. No. 15,702). 
 The court explained that the “primary object” of the confrontation 
clause was “to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits . . . being used 
against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination 
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of the witness.”  Id. at 242.  Prior sworn testimony, the court explained, is 
not the evil the confrontation clause targets. Id. The court understood that 
its holding would “deprive[]” a defendant “of the advantage of that 
personal presence of the witness before the jury which the law has designed 
for his protection,” but noted that the general rule “must occasionally give 
way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case,” and 
that letting the guilty walk free in all cases where their accusers were no 
longer available “would be carrying his constitutional protection to an 
unwarrantable extent.  The law, in its wisdom, declares that the rights of the 
public shall not be wholly sacrificed in order that an incidental benefit may 
be preserved to the accused.”  Id. at 243.  Thus, confrontation was satisfied 
“in the advantage he has once had of seeing the witness face to face, and 
subjecting him to the ordeal of cross-examination.”  Id. at 244 (emphasis 
added).   
Mattox’s holding has been reaffirmed for more than 100 years.  
Though the language of Mattox itself was broad enough to include 
preliminary hearings, the Supreme Court first addressed preliminary 
hearings specifically nearly half a century ago in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 
149, 165 (1970). 
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 In Green, Porter sold marijuana to an undercover officer.  399 U.S. at 
151.  After Porter was arrested, he named Green as his supplier. Id. Porter 
later testified for the State at Green’s preliminary hearing, where he was 
cross-examined by defense counsel.  Id.  At trial, Porter again testified, but 
became “markedly evasive and uncooperative,” claiming that he had 
forgotten who his supplier was.  Id. at 151-52 (citation and quotation 
omitted). The court admitted Porter’s preliminary hearing testimony to 
impeach him.  Id. at 152. The California Supreme Court held that admitting 
Porter’s preliminary hearing testimony violated Green’s confrontation 
rights.  Id. at 153.  
 The United States Supreme Court reversed. The court acknowledged 
that one virtue of having a witness testify at trial was that the jury could 
“observe the demeanor of the witness in making his statement,” which 
would aid “the jury in assessing his credibility.”  Id. at 158.  But the court 
cautioned that this direct observation was not the be-all and end-all of the 
Confrontation Clause—while it “may be true that a jury would be in a better 
position to evaluate the truth of the prior statement if it could somehow be 
whisked magically back in time to witness” it, the Constitution did not 
require that.  Id. at 160-61.   
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 Granted, Porter actually testified at Green’s trial, and was subject to 
cross-examination on his prior statements.  Id. at 161-62.  But the Court’s 
holding was not limited to that circumstance. The Court explained that 
“Porter’s preliminary hearing testimony was admissible” under the 
Confrontation Clause even if Porter had not testified at trial, because his 
preliminary hearing statement was “given under circumstances closely 
approximating those that surround a typical trial,” which included: 
• Porter was under oath; 
• Green was represented by counsel; 
• Green’s counsel had the opportunity to cross-examine 
Porter on his statements to police, without any significant 
limitation; and 
• the proceedings were held in front of a judge.   
Id. at 165-66.  Under these circumstances, the preliminary hearing was not 
“significantly different from an actual trial” for confrontation purposes, and 
the preliminary hearing testimony would have been admissible even if 
Porter had been unavailable to testify at trial.  Id. (citing Mattox, 156 U.S. 
257).   
 It is true that Green was decided before both Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 
56 (1980) and Crawford, which set out the current confrontation 
requirements.  But both Roberts and Crawford show Green’s continuing 
validity.   
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 Roberts was charged with check forgery and possession of stolen 
credit cards from a Bernard Isaacs.  Roberts, 448 U.S. at 58.  One of the 
witnesses for Roberts at the preliminary hearing was Anita Isaacs—
Bernard’s daughter—who let Roberts stay at her apartment.  Id.  Anita 
denied giving Roberts permission to use her father’s checks and credit 
cards.  Id.  At trial, Roberts claimed that Anita had given him the financial 
instruments “with the understanding that he could use them.”  Id. at 59.  
Anita was not available to testify at trial, so the State introduced her 
preliminary hearing testimony to rebut Roberts’ claim.  Id. 
 Like the California court in Green, the Ohio Supreme Court in Roberts 
held that prior preliminary hearing testimony was inadmissible under the 
Confrontation Clause because there was “little incentive to cross-examine a 
witness at a preliminary hearing, where the ultimate issue is only probable 
cause.”  Id. at 61 (citation and quotation omitted).  The Supreme Court 
reversed and re-affirmed Green, explaining that the preliminary hearing 
afforded an “adequate opportunity to cross-examine.”  Id. at 73 (citation 
omitted). 
 True, the Roberts court also held that hearsay statements of an 
unavailable declarant were admissible under the Confrontation Clause so 
long as they bore “adequate indicia of reliability.”  Id. at 66 (quotation 
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omitted).   And the Supreme Court later abandoned this test in Crawford in 
favor of the two-element test of (1) unavailability and (2) prior opportunity 
for cross-examination. 541 U.S. at 60.  
 But Crawford itself noted that Roberts’ result likely survived under the 
Crawford test.  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58. This was so because, despite reciting 
the “reliable hearsay” test that Crawford disavowed, the Roberts court 
“hew[ed] closely to the traditional line” by admitting “testimony from a 
preliminary hearing at which the defendant had cross-examined the 
witness.”  And like Roberts, Crawford re-affirmed Green and Mattox. Id. at 57 
(citing Green and Mattox for proposition that “preliminary hearing 
testimony is admissible only if the defendant had an adequate opportunity 
to cross-examine”).   
This Court has also repeatedly affirmed the admission of an 
unavailable witness’s preliminary hearing testimony, most recently this 
year.  Mackin v. State, 2016 UT 47, ¶¶38-42, __ P.3d __; Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 
402-03; State v. Lovell, 758 P.2d 909, 913-14 (Utah 1988); State v. Brooks, 638 
P.2d 537, 540-42 (Utah 1981).  For example, in Brooks.  There, four transients 
fought each other in the “hobo jungle” over $14.  Brooks, 638 P.2d at 538.  
Two of the men were charged with aggravated assault, and the other two 
testified against them at a preliminary hearing, where they were cross-
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examined. Id. When the victims were later declared unavailable, their prior 
testimony came in at trial over Brooks’s confrontation objection.  Id.  
This Court affirmed under the Roberts reliability test—which 
governed confrontation clause questions at the time—but explained that the 
reliability of the testimony sprang from a preliminary hearing, “with all its 
formalities and protections.” Id. at 540-41.  And it rejected Brooks’s 
argument that preliminary hearings did not afford an adequate opportunity 
to cross-examine based on the limited purpose of the hearing, explaining 
that the defense’s “motive and interest are the same” at both preliminary 
hearing and trial—to establish the defendant’s innocence.  Id. at 541.    
This Court also held prior preliminary hearing testimony admissible 
in both Lovell, 758 P.2d at 913-14, and Menzies, 889 P.2d at 402-03, which 
were decided under Roberts. And this Court most recently affirmed the 
admission of prior preliminary hearing testimony under Crawford in Mackin, 
2016 UT 47, ¶¶40-42.   
The court of appeals has followed suit.  See State v. Goins, 2016 UT 
App 57, 370 P.3d 942, cert. granted, 384 P.3d 567; West Valley City v. Kent, 
2016 UT App 8, 366 P.3d 415; State v. Garrido, 2013 UT App 245, 314 P.3d 
1014. This Court has approved this course. See Mackin, 2016 UT 47, ¶39 
(holding that Garrido is “[c]onsistent” with Crawford and Menzies).  And at 
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least three federal circuits and seven other states have similarly held 
preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable witness to be admissible 
under the confrontation clause. See United States v. Avants, 367 F.3d 433, 445 
(5th Cir. 2004); Glenn v. Dallman, 635 F.2d 1183, 1187 (6th Cir. 1980); United 
States ex rel. Haywood v. Wolff, 658 F.2d 455, 459-60 (7th Cir. 1981); People v. 
Williams, 181 P.3d 1035, 1061 (Cal.App.4th 2008); State v. Vinhaca, 205 P.3d 
649 (Haw. 2009); State v. Young, 87 P.3d 308, 316-17 (Kan. 2004); State v. 
Aaron, 218 S.W.3d 501, 517 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007); Chavez v. State, 213 P.3d 476, 
479 (Nev. 2009); State v. Henderson, 136 P.3d 1005, 1011 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006); 
Primeaux v. State, 88 P.3d 893, 905-06 (Okla. Crim. App. 2004); see also United 
States v. Williams, 116 Fed.Appx. 890, 891-92 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding 
deposition testimony admissible under confrontation clause); Simmons v. 
State, 234 S.W.3d 321, 326 (Ark. Ct. App. 2006) (same); People v. Yost, 749 
N.W.2d 753, 774-75 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008) (same).  
B. Pham has shown no compelling reason to depart from this 
long-established, and correct, precedent. 
 Notwithstanding this extensive authority, Pham asks this Court to 
reverse a century-old course and hold that preliminary hearings—due to 
their limited purpose—are all but per se inadequate to afford a defendant 
the opportunity to cross-examine a witness “absent exceptional 
circumstances.”  Pet.Br. 15-16, 22.  This Court should decline to do so. 
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 It is true, as Pham points out, that preliminary hearings take place 
early on in a case and are generally limited to determining whether 
probable cause exists.  Id.  It is also true that there is no right to confront 
witnesses at preliminary hearings, and that the State may choose to present 
written statements in lieu of live testimony.  See Utah R. Evid. 1102; State v. 
Timmerman, 2009 UT 58, 218 P.3d 590.   
 But where the State elects to present live testimony, defendants 
do have a rule-based right to cross-examine. Utah R. Crim. P. 7(i)(1). Where 
there is a prior opportunity to test credibility through cross-examination, 
confrontation is satisfied.  See, e.g., State v. Stano, 159 P.3d 931, 945 (Kan. 
2007) (holding no confrontation violation from admission of preliminary 
hearing testimony where defendants are not barred from cross-examining 
witnesses at preliminary hearing on credibility); Chavez, 213 P.3d at 485 
(similar).   
Though Pham asserts that there “was no cross-examination regarding 
[the victim’s] credibility and veracity,” Pet.Br. 9, this side-steps the issue. 
The Supreme Court in Owens made clear that cross-examination need not 
even necessarily take place—the defendant need only have the opportunity 
to cross-examine.  484 U.S. at 559. Contrary to his assertion, id. at 19, Pham 
had that. And as shown, counsel did explore several avenues in cross, 
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including the victim’s background, marital status, failure to pay hospital 
bills, interactions with police the day of the incident, relationship to those 
involved, ability to perceive, memory, and details of the incident. R291:14–
26.   
 Further, however limited other preliminary hearings might be, the 
one here had those characteristics that the Green court held “closely 
approximat[e] those that surround a typical trial”—the victim was under 
oath; Pham was represented by counsel; defense counsel had the 
opportunity to cross-examine the victim without any limitation; and the 
proceedings were held in front of a judge. Green, 399 U.S. at 165-66; see also 
Menzies, 889 P.2d 403 (holding preliminary hearing testimony reliable where 
it was “given under oath before a judge and Menzies was represented by 
counsel who had the opportunity to cross-examine” the witness). And 
tellingly, though Pham discusses potential shortfalls in preliminary hearing 
cross-examinations, Pet.Br. 19-22, he points to nothing in this case that 
counsel might have done differently. See Pham, 2016 UT App 105, ¶18 n.2 
(holding that Pham did not “identify any shortcomings in the cross-
examination actually conducted at his preliminary hearing. Rather, [he] 
simply urged [the court of appeals] to hold, as a matter of law, that Utah 
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preliminary hearings never provide defendants with sufficient opportunity 
to cross-examine witness so as to satisfy the Confrontation Clause”). 
 In pressing his position, Pham relies largely on (1) Utah’s Victim 
Rights Amendments to the state constitution permitting the use of reliable 
hearsay at preliminary hearings; and (2) People v. Fry, 92 P.3d 970 (Colo. 
2004).  Neither is persuasive. 
 After this Court decided Brooks, the Utah Constitution was amended 
to make clear that the purpose of preliminary hearings was to determine 
probable cause, and that reliable hearsay was admissible.  See Pham, 2016 
UT App 105, ¶17 n.3.  This overturned this Court’s decision in State v. 
Anderson, 612 P.2d 778 (Utah 1980), which held that there was a state 
constitutional right to cross-examine at preliminary hearings.   
 But the possibility of the State proceeding—in other cases—on 
reliable hearsay rather than live testimony at preliminary hearings does not 
affect the federal constitutional analysis.  If the State had relied on affidavits 
in lieu of live testimony here, then there would have been no opportunity 
for cross-examination, and the victim’s statements would not have come in 
at trial.   
 Pham also cites to People v. Fry, 92 P.3d 970 (Colo. 2004).  Pet.Br. 22-26. 
But Fry is unpersuasive.  There, the Colorado Supreme Court held that 
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because preliminary hearings in that state are limited to probable cause 
findings, they could not afford an adequate prior opportunity for cross-
examination.  Id. at 977.  But as shown, the Supreme Court rejected this very 
sort of reasoning as far back as Mattox and as recently as Green and Roberts. 
And whatever the limits of preliminary hearings generally, the one here 
retained the characteristics that both the United States Supreme Court and 
this Court have held most critical—an oath, a judge, a witness able to be 
cross-examined, and a defendant represented by counsel.   
 Further, this Court explicitly rejected the very case on which Fry 
relied—People v. Smith, 597 P.2d 204 (Colo. 1979)—in Brooks. Fry cited Smith 
for the proposition that “due to the limited nature of the preliminary 
hearing, the opportunity for cross-examination was insufficient to satisfy 
the Confrontation Clause.” 92 P.3d at 977.  Brooks argued that former rule 
of evidence 63(3)(b)(ii)—in light of Smith—showed that preliminary hearing 
testimony was inadmissible.  That rule stated that hearsay statements were 
admissible if the declarant were unavailable and “the adverse party on the 
former occasion had the right and opportunity for cross-examination with 
an interest and motive similar to that which the adverse party has in the 
action in which the testimony is offered.”  Brooks, 638 P.2d at 541. Brooks 
argued that Smith showed that defense counsel’s “motive and interest”—
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and thus opportunity to cross-examine—were different at preliminary 
hearings than at trial.  Id.  
 This Court disagreed—and directly rejected Smith’s reasoning—
holding that defense counsel’s “motive and interest are the same” at both 
preliminary hearing and trial” and that “cross-examination takes place” at 
both “under the same motive and interest.”  638 P.2d at 541. Thus, a 
preliminary hearing afforded an adequate opportunity for cross-
examination. Id.; see also Henderson, 136 P.3d at 1010 (“At the preliminary 
hearing and trial, Defendant was charged with the same crimes, he had the 
same defense counsel, and the same opportunity and motive to cross-
examine” the witness); State v. Mohamed, 130 P.3d 401, 405 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2006) (“Mohamed’s interest at the pretrial hearing was the same as it would 
have been at trial, and equally pressing: to establish [victim’s] recantation as 
credible and prove that her out of court statements were unreliable.”). 
Contrary to the court of appeals’ reasoning, Pham, 2016 UT App 105, ¶17 
n.3, this aspect of Brooks was unaffected by the later constitutional 
amendment permitting the use of reliable hearsay.  
Further, other courts have almost universally rejected Fry’s reasoning.  
Most of the courts addressing Fry have either distinguished it or outright 
declined to follow it. This is because Fry’s extreme outcome results in “a 
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blanket prohibition of preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable 
witness”—which the “majority of courts do not condone.” State v. Mantz, 
222 P.3d 471, 477 (Idaho Ct. App. 2009); see, e.g., People v. Thompson, case no. 
C058768, 2009 WL 4758792, *14 (Cal. App. 3d. Dec. 14, 2009) (refusing to 
follow Fry); State v. Nofoa, 349 P.3d 327, 339–40 (Haw. 2015) (refusing to 
follow Fry’s “complete ban on preliminary hearing” testimony in favor of 
reviewing each decision on “case-by-case basis”); Stano, 159 P.3d at 945 
(refusing to follow Fry where defendants can cross-examine state witnesses 
at preliminary hearings and have similar motives to trial); State v. Aaron, 218 
S.W.3d 501, 516 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007) (refusing to follow Fry despite 
defendant’s admittedly different “interest and motive in his cross-
examination” at preliminary hearing); Chavez, 213 P.3d at 484-85 (refusing to 
follow Fry); Henderson, 136 P.3d at 1010; (refusing to follow Fry and holding 
that counsel had same motive and interest both at preliminary hearing and 
at trial); Mohamed, 130 P.3d at 402, 404-05 (refusing to follow Fry because 
defendant had similar motive and prior opportunity to cross-examine); see 
also O’Neal v. Province, 415 Fed.Appx. 921, 923–24 (10th Cir. 2011) (affirming 
lower court because preliminary hearing afforded sufficient opportunity for 
prior cross-examination); Parker v. Jones, 423 Fed.Appx. 824, 831–32 (10th 
Cir. 2011) (same); United States v. Hargrove, 382 Fed.Appx. 765, 779 (10th Cir. 
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2010) (affirming lower court even “if defendant’s cross-examination of 
witness at the preliminary hearing was narrow in scope and would have 
been conducted differently” if counsel knew the witness would be 
unavailable at trial); Bowman v. Neal, 172 Fed.Appx. 819, 828–29 (10th Cir. 
2006) (affirming lower court’s admission of preliminary hearing testimony 
even when limitations were placed on defense counsel’s prior cross-
examination).   
 Pham cites a few cases from other jurisdictions purportedly following 
Fry to buoy up his claim, Pet.Br. 23-27, but they are unpersuasive for the 
same reasons that Fry itself is unpersuasive.  They are also distinguishable.  
State v. Stuart, 695 N.W.2d 259 (Wis. 2005), for example, did not adopt a per 
se ban on using preliminary hearing testimony, like the Colorado court did 
in Fry. It merely stated that when a cross-examination is in fact restricted on 
credibility issues, a confrontation problem could arise if the prosecution 
later tried to use that testimony at trial.  Id.at 266. There, both parties agreed 
that the restricted preliminary hearing cross-examination of defendant’s 
brother did not satisfy the Confrontation Clause, and the court agreed. Id. at 
265. 
 Coronado v. Texas, 351 S.W.3d 315 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011), as Pham 
acknowledges, “did not involve preliminary hearing testimony,” but an 
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interview of a child witness where there was no opportunity for cross-
examination under oath. Pet.Br. 24. And Blanton v. State, 978 So.2d 149 (Fla. 
2008) involved a deposition.  
Pham also presses a number of policy arguments, none of them 
persuasive.  He alleges—without citation or evidence—that if defense 
counsel were required to fully cross-examine at preliminary hearings “there 
may be little time left for judges to conduct actual trials.” Pet.Br. 19.  But the 
preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable witness has been 
admissible at trial in Utah since Maddox, Green, or at very least, Brooks.  The 
intervening decades have not created unmanageable caseloads.   
And Pham’s “assumption that there are thousands of cases” in which 
defendants “are entitled to a preliminary hearing,” and that hearing them 
all would put a “burden on already strained judicial resources,” Pet.Br. 19-
20, is beside the point.  Having the right and exercising the right are two 
different things. The vast majority of defendants waive their preliminary 
hearings—or plead guilty, thereby waiving their confrontation right. Cf. 
Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012) (noting that 97% of federal 
convictions and 94% of state convictions result from guilty pleas); Missouri 
v. Frye, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (same); Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(3) (listing 
confrontation right among those waived by guilty plea). Because the law is 
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so long-established, recent decisions affirming the admission of prior 
preliminary hearing testimony could not have created—as Pham asserts—a 
“climate of uncertainty” regarding the extent of defense counsel’s duties in 
cross-examinations at preliminary hearings. Pet.Br. 20. It has long been 
certain that such testimony could be admissible if the declarant were 
unavailable, the defendant had counsel, and counsel were able to cross-
examine the witness.   
Pham also asserts that evidence discovered after the preliminary 
hearing often affects cross-examination at trial, and that a preliminary 
hearing conducted before all discovery is available to the defense 
necessarily renders the prior opportunity inadequate.  Pet.Br. 21.  But it is 
not apparent that, should such evidence arise, it would be inadmissible.  
Indeed, the victim in Garrido, though absent at trial, was extensively 
impeached with evidence obtained after the preliminary hearing.  See 
Garrido, 2013 UT App 245, ¶22; see also Brooks, 638 P.2d at 541 (noting that 
defense counsel were unaware of some evidence during preliminary 
hearing, but nothing prevented counsel from presenting the inconsistency 
to the jury at trial).    
This Court also addressed that circumstance in State v. Menzies, 889 
P.2d 393, 402-03 (Utah 1994).  Menzies’s former cell mate, Walter Britton, 
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testified at Menzies’s preliminary hearing that Menzies confessed to killing 
the victim.  Id. at 401.  At trial, Britton became uncooperative and refused to 
testify, despite the court holding him in contempt.  Id.  The trial court ruled 
Britton unavailable and admitted his preliminary hearing testimony.  Id. at 
401-02.  
 On appeal, Menzies argued a confrontation violation, based in part 
on his inability to cross-examine Britton using convictions that occurred 
between preliminary hearing and trial.  Id. at 403.  This court affirmed, 
explaining that while it “agree[d] that new evidence obtained after the 
hearing may have aided an attack on Britton’s credibility on cross-
examination, the preliminary hearing transcript indicate[d] that the issue 
was well-explored.”  Id.  
Pham has not met his heavy burden of convincing this Court that a 
long line of authority stretching back more than a century—and approved 
by this Court as recently as last October—has become unworkable or was 
incorrectly decided in the first instance.  See generally Menzies, 889 P.2d at 
398.  The correct rule is essentially a mirror image of Pham’s proposed rule. 
Pham argues that preliminary hearings as a general rule cannot afford an 
adequate opportunity for cross-examination “absent exceptional 
circumstances.”  Pet.Br. 22.  In reality, preliminary hearing testimony of an 
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unavailable declarant is generally admissible absent exceptional 
circumstances, such as where a magistrate significantly limits cross-
examination on credibility issues.    
Finally, there are important policy reasons to reject Pham’s near-
blanket approach.  In fairness to the State and victims, a defendant should 
not walk free merely because a victim has become unavailable after being 
cross-examined at a preliminary hearing.  As the Mattox court explained, 
“To say that a criminal . . . should go scot free simply because death has 
closed the mouth of” the victim “would be carrying his constitutional 
protection to an unwarrantable extent.  The law, in its wisdom, declares that 
the rights of the public shall not be wholly sacrificed in order than an 
incidental benefit may be preserved to the accused.”  156 U.S. at 243.   
Those “incidental benefits” included “testing the recollection and 
sifting the conscience of the witness” and “compelling him to stand face to 
face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge his 
demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony 
whether he is worthy of belief.” Id. at 242-43.  Cf. Green, 399 U.S. at 160 
(rejecting confrontation claim based on admission of preliminary hearing 
testimony even though it “may be true that a jury would be in a better 
position to evaluate the truth of the prior statements if it could somehow be 
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whisked magically back in time to witness a grueling cross-examination” at 
the time of the statement). Pham likewise argues these incidental benefits 
compel a different result, Pet.Br. 19, but the Supreme Court long ago 
rejected that argument.  Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243.   
Fairness concerns are particularly acute in domestic violence and 
gang cases, where it is lamentably common for victims to become 
uncooperative—and thus unavailable—out of fear of the defendant, a 
misplaced sense of love or loyalty, or some other factor outside the State’s 
control.  See, e.g., Garrido, 2013 UT App 245, ¶¶4, 23-26 (discussing domestic 
violence victim’s lack of cooperation with prosecution stemming from fear). 
C. Admitting the unavailable victim’s cross-examined 
preliminary hearing testimony did not violate Pham’s 
confrontation right. 
   Pham’s arguments focus almost exclusively on other cases—
precedent, possible consequences, and the like, Pet.Br. 12-29—which the 
State has responded to.  But even if this Court disagrees with the State, it 
should still hold that Pham has not shown a violation of his confrontation 
right.   
 Even if—as Pham contends, id. at 22—it would be a rare case in which 
a preliminary hearing would afford an adequate opportunity for cross-
examination, this case qualifies. Other than the lack of in-person 
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observation by the jury, id. at 19, 28 he points to no defect in or limitation of 
the cross-examination that took place at preliminary hearing. Though he 
asserts that “discovery was not complete” at the time, id. at 28, he does not 
point to any evidence that later came to his attention that he would have 
used had the victim appeared at trial.  See Pham, 2016 UT App 105, ¶¶18-19 
& n.4 (holding no confrontation violation because Pham did not allege 
changed motive between preliminary hearing and trial, trial court did not 
limit cross-examination, and Pham did “not identify any shortcomings in 
the cross-examination” at preliminary hearing). And because he has not 
identified what any of that evidence is, he has not postulated how it may 
have tipped the credibility finding in his favor.   
 Likewise, he has pointed to no limitation—court- or self-imposed—on 
his actual examination, let alone one so severe that it calls into serious 
question the adequacy of his prior opportunity to cross-examine.  By 
pressing issues not at issue here, Pham is essentially requesting an advisory 
opinion, which this Court is loath to issue.  See UTA v. Local 382 of 
Amalgamated Transit Union, 2012 UT 75, ¶19, 289 P.3d 582 (explaining that 
Utah “courts are not a forum for hearing academic contentions or rendering 
advisory opinions” when there is not a “controversy directly affect rights.”) 
(citations and quotations omitted). But at any rate, Pham has not shown that 
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the preliminary hearing in his case did not afford him an adequate 
opportunity to cross-examine the victim, and this Court should affirm.  
CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals. 
 Respectfully submitted on January 4, 2017. 
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